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The Mighty Myths of Kelo
By John R. Nolon
The press releases of 
property rights activists and 
the media’s rapid embrace 
of their views have perpetu-
ated several myths about the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Kelo v. New London.1 In 
the immediate aftermath of 
this myth making, the legis-
latures of several states have 
adopted restrictions on the 
use of eminent domain with 
uncharacteristic speed. Wisely, 
the New York State Legislature has been more cautious in 
its reaction. 
As it turns out, many of the eminent domain laws in 
other states have nothing to do with New London’s pro-
gram of area-wide redevelopment or the legal holding of 
the Kelo case. In fact some will have the unintended con-
sequence of crippling state and municipal efforts to direct 
the redevelopment of inner-city neighborhoods, coastal 
areas subject to inundation due to climate change, and 
cities trying to rebuild after devastating natural disasters. 
Myth #1: New London’s Objective Was Economic 
Development
New London is a formally designated “distressed 
city.” In Connecticut, a state in which there is a great 
disparity between haves and have-nots, New London 
houses mostly the latter. Its 5.5 square miles were carved 
out of the affl uent town of Waterford, which has a 
property tax rate 40 percent lower than New London’s. 
The city serves, as most older cities do, to house transit 
facilities, hospitals, colleges, polluting industries, and 
low- and moderate-income workers: all resources criti-
cal to its region’s well-being. New London’s poverty and 
unemployment rates are well above the state’s average. 
Because the city lost a naval base and most of its indus-
trial jobs, its tax base declined and it has fl irted with 
municipal bankruptcy. 
New London, after much public discussion and de-
bate, adopted an area-wide redevelopment plan for one 
of the few relatively low-density parcels left, next to the 
shuttered naval facility and a state-funded public park. 
The plan envisioned a small mixed-use, tourist-oriented 
urban village, with public parking, a renovated marina 
and river walk open to the public, and some restaurants 
and shopping. These activities would generate 1,000 new 
jobs, bring tax revenues to the fi scally strapped city, and 
enable it to provide better services to its low- and moder-
ate-income residents and workers and continued service 
to the region beyond. 
It would be startling news to generations of urban 
policy makers that this New London program was de-
signed to achieve “economic development.” Area-wide 
redevelopment programs are a response to a tight knot of 
despair in distressed cities like New London. These cities 
were called places “from which men turn” by the unani-
mous U.S. Supreme Court in Berman v. Parker,2 which 
upheld an area-wide urban renewal plan in the District 
of Columbia over 50 years ago. Countless local, state, 
and federal programs have struggled to restore inner-city 
regional centers; to obtain the proper balance of housing, 
industrial, and commercial facilities; and to increase their 
attractiveness to persons of all incomes to make them 
desirable places to live, work, shop, and enjoy life and its 
urban amenities. 
Myth #2: Berman v. Parker Made New Law
The Kelo Court based its decision on the Berman case 
which upheld the constitutionality of condemning the 
non-blighted property owned by the plaintiff in the inter-
est of area-wide redevelopment of an inner-city neighbor-
hood. It also sanctioned the lease or sale of condemned 
land to private redevelopment companies whose projects 
conform to the area-wide plan. According to the myth, 
that Court confused the narrow concept of public use (for 
which property may be condemned) with the broader 
defi nition of public purpose (which justifi es other govern-
ment functions, such as land use regulations). 
The Berman Court—all nine Justices—thought that 
condemnation could be employed to accomplish any ob-
jective for which sovereign power can be exercised when 
it permitted condemnation of private land for a “public 
use.”3 The myth claims that “public use” is limited to a 
narrower range of objectives: takings for public works 
projects, public utility projects, or projects that the public 
at large will actually be able to use, such as a park. There 
is no evidence of any discussion of this distinction among 
the Constitution’s framers; in fact, the Court had assumed 
the opposite for over 50 years before the Berman decision 
was handed down. 
In 1893, Congress authorized the War Department to 
condemn private property in and around the Gettysburg 
battlefi eld. The Gettysburg Electric Railway Company 
challenged this act, arguing that the preservation of the 
lines of battle by preventing the completion of its rail 
line was not a public use as that term is used in the Fifth 
Amendment. In U.S. v. Gettysburg Electric Railway Co., the 
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Court addressed this question: whether “the use to which 
the petitioner desires to put the land . . . is of that kind of 
public use for which the government of the United States 
is authorized to condemn land.”4 
The Court held that the government “has authority to 
do so whenever it is necessary or appropriate to use the 
land in the execution of any of the powers granted to it 
by the constitution. . . . [W]hen the legislature has de-
clared the use or purpose to be a public one, its judgment 
will be respected by the courts. . . .”5 As if anticipating 
future questions, the Court added, “The power to con-
demn for this purpose need not be plainly and unmistak-
ably deduced from any one of the particularly specifi ed 
powers. Any number of those powers may be grouped 
together, and an inference from them all may be drawn 
that the power claimed has been conferred.”6 
Myth # 3: Condemned Land Cannot Be 
Transferred to a Private Entity
What about the Berman court’s authorization of the 
transfer of title to condemned land to the private sec-
tor for redevelopment—surely that was a newly minted 
concept? To the contrary. That complaint was settled by 
the Court in a 1906 opinion: Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold 
Mining Co.7 In Strickley, an easement over the plaintiff’s 
property was condemned and handed over to his neigh-
bor, a private mining company. The complaint was that 
this was done solely for private benefi t and was not, 
therefore, a public use under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. The condemnation was done under a Utah 
statute which asserted that the public welfare of the state 
demanded that mining operations in the mountains have 
access to rail lines in its valleys.
Justice Holmes wrote the opinion of the Court which 
addressed the sole question of whether the Utah statute 
is consistent with the constitutional prescriptions regard-
ing the condemnation of property for a public use. His 
response follows: “In the opinion of the state legislature 
and the Supreme Court of Utah, the public welfare of that 
State demands that aerial lines between the mines on its 
mountain sides and the railways in the valleys below 
should not be made impossible by the refusal of a private 
owner to sell the right to cross his land. The Constitution 
of the United States does not require us to say that they 
are wrong.”8
For a more modern endorsement of taking private 
property and transferring it to other private parties where 
the larger public interest is clearly promoted, see Ruck-
elshaus v. Monsanto.9 There the Court upheld a provision 
of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide 
Act which “took” the data submitted by private compa-
nies to support their applications for a permit to market 
chemicals. It allowed the EPA to use their private data to 
evaluate subsequent applications, so long as the later ap-
plicants paid just compensation for the data. The public 
benefi t is in the speedier entrance into the market of valu-
able chemical products.
Myth # 4: Every American Home and Shop Is 
Vulnerable to a Taking 
The petitioners in Kelo were represented by an advo-
cacy litigation group that raised public awareness of the 
fact that some public takings are abusive. It cited evidence 
of condemnations of homes and shops of innocent owners 
whose property was taken primarily to benefi t a Wal-
mart, a Ritz Hotel, or even Donald Trump. The specter of 
corrupt, or misguided, local offi cials condemning title to 
property of private owners primarily to benefi t develop-
ers was on the mind of the Court in the Kelo decision. The 
majority made it clear that “[s]uch a one-to-one transfer 
of property, executed outside the confi nes of an integrated 
development plan, is not presented in this case.”10 
The background of the New London case illustrates 
the extent of the government’s presence in typical area-
wide development planning. The state designated New 
London an economically distressed city. Its area-wide 
plan was supported by a $5 million state grant. The state 
also provided a $10 million grant to establish Fort Trum-
bull park. The state authorized the city to establish the 
New London Development Corporation, a quasi-public 
body, which was then created by the city council to pre-
pare the plan and implement it as the city’s agent. Such 
public development corporations are created and gov-
erned by the state Municipal Development Statute which 
authorizes the condemnation of land that cannot be 
acquired voluntarily and without which the project can-
not succeed. Each qualifying project is designated by the 
state statute as “public use.” Under that statute, a detailed 
public process must be followed including public input, 
public hearings, and full transparency. The resulting plan 
in New London was approved by the city council and 
by the State of Connecticut. The New London Develop-
ment Corporation eventually selected one developer out 
of a group of applicants to which the land is to be leased, 
not sold, remaining in public ownership. Finally, the city 
agreed to install some of the needed infrastructure as a 
contribution to the area-wide project’s success.
Justice Kennedy, in a concurring opinion in Kelo, 
discussed how courts handle one-to-one transfers. He 
demonstrated that, using the rational basis test that all 
police power actions must meet, courts can invalidate 
such condemnations by fi nding that the public benefi ts 
achieved by such a transfer are only incidental to the 
benefi ts that will be conferred on the private parties. The 
dissenters in Kelo disparaged Kennedy’s confi dence in 
the rational basis test as suffi cient to ferret out privately 
motivated takings by applying the “stupid staffer” test: 
suggesting that only the most inept administrations could 
fail to paper over a private deal and make it appear pub-
lic in nature.
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The dissent was apparently unaware of numer-
ous cases called to the Court’s attention in amici briefs 
submitted in Kelo. In 99 Cents Only Store v. Lancaster 
Redevelopment Agency, for example, a federal district court 
in California invalidated the condemnation of a store to 
accommodate the interest of an adjacent Costco’s expan-
sion plans; it found that the redevelopment agency’s only 
purpose “was to satisfy the private expansion demands 
of Costco.”11 In Bailey v. Meyers, the state court held that 
the taking of a brake shop for the construction of a hard-
ware store to advance economic development lacked the 
requisite public purpose.12 Donald Trump’s attempt to 
get the Casino Reinvestment Development Authority in 
New Jersey to condemn the parcels of a few landowners 
who had refused to sell to expand his hotel and casino 
was thwarted by the state court; it found that the Au-
thority had given Trump a blank check regarding future 
development on the site.13 
Under state law, in fact, courts have invalidated 
condemnations in Arizona, California, Georgia, Illinois, 
Indiana, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, and Virginia. 
In all these cases, there was no sustaining public pres-
ence of the type involved in all area-wide redevelopment 
projects. In cases involving no more than a one-to-one 
transfer of title between businesses, as a de facto matter, 
the court can use the rational basis test to look closely at 
whether the private benefi t achieved is dominant and 
the public benefi t incidental. This enables state courts to 
invalidate such condemnations, saving the homes of av-
erage Americans and the businesses of moms and pops, 
dulling the edge of the hard-cutting rhetoric of those 
alarmed by the majority’s decision in Kelo.  
Myth # 5: Private Gain was the Motive for the 
Condemnation in Kelo
Reactions to Kelo pointed out that developers often 
drive public decisions to condemn private land. They 
somehow convince public offi cials who stand for reelec-
tion frequently to exercise public authority primarily 
for the developers’ private gain. In New London, there 
was no developer on the scene during the entire twenty-
month decision-making process. The New London Re-
development Authority, a publicly created, not-for-profi t 
corporation, was authorized to purchase and condemn 
land for the area-wide development project. Following 
acquisition, it was authorized to advertise for private 
redevelopers, select one, and lease the acquired land to 
that developer. 
Area-wide development projects, under state laws 
that govern them, are subject to onerous, transparent, 
and lengthy processes that provide all the details of the 
project and invite public participation and extensive 
debate. In New London, the public was asked what it 
thought about the redevelopment project as the project 
was debated, shaped, and decided over a period of near-
ly two years. In New York, under the State Environmental 
Quality Review Act, redevelopment projects generate 
foot-high environmental impact statements that include 
a hard look at their impact on community character and 
neighborhood change, and contain lengthy chapters on 
the economic and environmental consequences of the 
project. 
Public hearings, Uniform Land Use Review Process 
proceedings in New York City, reviews of impact state-
ments, open meeting laws, confl ict-of-interest rules, and 
a host of other legal protections ensure that the public 
knows who is involved, how they were chosen, what the 
proposed benefi ts are, and who will suffer. By the time 
such projects are approved, this public process has medi-
ated the claims of those whose properties are to be taken 
and the public benefi ts of urban revitalization: jobs, hous-
ing, increased taxes, better services, and a more livable 
community. 
Myth # 6: State Legislation Limiting Eminent 
Domain Is Clearly Benefi cial to the Public
The many state legislative reforms that followed 
Kelo’s discontents can be divided into two categories. The 
fi rst includes those that in effect needed procedural and 
substantive reforms: longer notice to affected landown-
ers, more public involvement, more transparency, better 
area-wide planning, or clearer articulation of the public 
benefi ts to be achieved. The second curtails the use of 
eminent domain in one of several ways: they limit it to 
public works, public access, or public utility projects; 
allow it in blighted areas, but defi ne blight narrowly; pro-
hibit it for economic development; prohibit the transfer of 
condemned land to private redevelopers; or some combi-
nation of these.
There are serious doubts about whether the conse-
quences of this second category of reforms are benefi cial. 
If Connecticut statutes, for example, limited condemna-
tion to public works projects or limited it to use in nar-
rowly defi ned blighted areas, New London would have 
had great diffi culty carrying out an area-wide develop-
ment project in aid of its revitalization. 
Several projects in New York City would have been 
frustrated if such laws had been adopted in New York. 
In an amici curiae brief fi led in Kelo, the Empire State 
Development Corporation noted its success in transform-
ing neighborhoods surrounding the New York Stock 
Exchange, Seven World Trade Center, and in the 42nd 
Street Redevelopment Area; it attributed its success, in 
part, to using its authority to condemn private properties 
and convey them to private development companies. The 
Corporation’s brief notes that “despite private benefi ts, 
the predominant economic and social benefi ts have ac-
crued to the public.”14
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In Rosenthal & Rosenthal v. The New York State Urban 
Development Corp., the Second Circuit affi rmed a District 
Court decision upholding the taking of the petition-
ers’ unblighted buildings which were needed for the 
42nd Street Redevelopment Project.15 The District Court 
found that the proposed taking was rationally related to 
a conceivable public purpose. The Second Circuit noted 
that “the power of eminent domain is a fundamental and 
necessary attribute of sovereignty, superior to all pri-
vate property rights.”16 It rested its decision on the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision the previous year in Hawaii 
Housing Authority v. Midkiff, concluding that “courts long 
have recognized that the compensated taking of private 
property for urban renewal or community redevelop-
ment is not proscribed by the Constitution.”17 The U. S. 
Supreme Court denied certiorari in Rosenthal in 1986.18
Various industrial companies, including several oil 
refi neries, challenged the City of Syracuse Industrial 
Development Agency for condemning their properties 
to further a waterfront redevelopment master plan for 
an 800-acre area on the south shore of Onondaga Lake 
known as “oil city.” Sun Company v. City of Syracuse IDA.19 
The area was located next to several low-income neigh-
borhoods in Syracuse where a disproportionately large 
percentage of welfare recipients, jobless, and poverty-
level households resided. This is a classic environmen-
tal justice context, but condemnation could be denied 
under reform bills that defi ne such projects as “economic 
development’’ or that require the city or IDA to develop 
the project itself, by prohibiting transfer of title or pos-
session to a private redevelopment company. The New 
York court in Sun Company found that the purpose of the 
taking was to accomplish a proper use. The petitioners’ 
motion for leave to appeal was denied by the Court of 
Appeals in 1997.20
Property rights advocates oppose condemnation be-
cause it victimizes limited-income homeowners. Consider 
New Orleans, still trying to fi nd the formula for redevel-
opment long after Katrina. In the absence of an area-wide 
plan and effective means of implementing it, many low-
er-income homeowners do not have the fi nancial where-
withal to repair or rebuild their homes. Many of them 
work for $10 to 15 an hour. With this income, they can 
afford a home costing around $70,000. In the lower Ninth 
Ward, lower-income homeowners have existing debt, 
face extremely high costs of repair, and must meet FEMA 
fl ood plain elevation requirements which alone can cost 
$30,000. The sum of these costs, in many cases, greatly 
exceeds what they can afford even considering available 
governmental subsidies, where they can be obtained. As  
a result, many property owners have sold their properties 
at 30 percent of pre-hurricane values. 
Area-wide development in New Orleans can’t work 
without the use of the power of eminent domain. Some 
owners cannot be found. Some parcels have no record 
owners. Some are slivers of land and not marketable, 
others are in foreclosure, some are tied up in estates that 
will never be resolved, others have multiple owners who 
cannot agree on what to do, and some are owned by indi-
viduals who are incapacitated. Although the situation is 
more dramatic, this confusion of titles is typical of condi-
tions in many inner-city neighborhoods, which are full of 
small parcels with owners who are not rational actors or 
cannot be found. 
What if a major hotel and entertainment center 
developer were ready to build a mixed-use project and, 
at the insistence of the city, to provide an equity position 
and affordable residences to the lot owners in the area? 
Would this be an economic development project? Would 
it be prohibited because some lots will be transferred to a 
private entity?
If this second category of statutory “reforms” had 
been adopted by Congress, would the Gettysburg battle-
fi eld still have been saved from a railroad’s extension at 
a critical moment? With such reforms, would the state of 
Utah have been able to extract needed minerals to further 
the public welfare at a key moment in the state’s overall 
development?
Conclusion
Before corrective legislation is enacted in New York 
there is more that we need to know about the use of 
condemnation in redevelopment. How much actual hard-
ship is caused to those whose homes and properties are 
condemned? Anecdotal evidence shows that most affect-
ed owners settle, agree on prices, and relocate. Some are 
unable to fi nd suitable new quarters and suffer economi-
cally as a result. A few actually benefi t from being trans-
planted. What corrective measures are needed to prevent 
documented hardships? Do we know whether redevelop-
ment projects would be feasible without the availability of 
condemnation? Again, there is evidence that many prop-
erty owners would fail to negotiate for a fair settlement 
with redevelopment agencies if they didn’t realize that 
the agency could take their property if negotiations fail. 
If the absence of the power of condemnation would 
mean that most redevelopment projects would not be 
feasible, what are the resultant costs to the public? Have 
redevelopment projects helped distressed cities to the 
benefi t of the public? Here the evidence is mixed: New 
London’s earlier downtown renewal efforts years ago 
were less than impressive, while recent revitalization proj-
ects in many regions today seem to be succeeding. 
The unique American approach to land development 
and urban revitalization is to empower local govern-
ments. Seldom are they required to do particular things, 
like protect wetlands, limit development to certain areas, 
or provide a certain amount of affordable housing. If cit-
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ies want to engage in area-wide redevelopment proj-
ects with qualifi ed and eligible private redevelopment 
companies, the approach has been to let them do so. The 
state legislature will give them that power, but it will not 
mandate that they use it. 
In reaction to Kelo, a few states have passed laws 
that constrain the power of city legislatures from being 
the architects of their own revitalization. The speed with 
which these limitations have been enacted in some states 
has been breathtaking. New London, New York, New 
Orleans, and Syracuse, along with other older industrial 
municipalities, need help. So do coastal cities fearing 
inundation and other cities as they recover from natural 
disasters. They get their legal authority to act from the 
state. They need technical assistance, fi nancial relief, in-
novative ways to attract private development, tax credits 
and abatements, help in modernizing needed infrastruc-
ture and providing affordable housing, and best practices 
for working with private fi rms to provide jobs and hous-
ing while protecting community character and environ-
mental resources for future generations. 
It is important to be clear about what is at stake here. 
The Kelo decision has been criticized as an assault on 
middle-class home and business owners in the pursuit of 
purely private-sector economic interests. This is a serious 
charge and one that must be addressed where condem-
nations achieve only incidental public benefi ts. To say 
that Kelo is about the pursuit of private interests, how-
ever, ignores what the case is about more fundamentally. 
It addresses the critical importance of the revitalization 
of cities from which more affl uent populations have fl ed. 
This demographic shift fuels sprawl, diminishes open 
space in exurban areas, and drains critical regional cen-
ters of their fi nancial strength. 
In our legislature, any surplus energy and resources 
should not be siphoned off in an effort to strip challenged 
cities and older suburbs of their powers. Instead, they 
should be devoted to the broader urban and develop-
ment agenda. Without strong regions with stable centers, 
New York cannot compete in the global economy. State 
governments should protect private property owners 
from the abusive use of eminent domain, promote need-
ed area-wide redevelopment, and encourage localities to 
use all the power they are given to become innovators as 
they struggle to regain their role as powerful centers of 
their economic regions. 
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